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Турция
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Communist Party of Turkey (current)
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  (Redirected from Communist Party of Turkey (2001))   The neutrality of this article is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved. (June 2009)
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Trkiye Komnist Partisi / Communist Party of Turkey



Leader   Erkan Ba

Founded   2001
Headquarters   Osman Aga Mahallesi Nihal Sokak, No:4 Kadky, stanbul, Istanbul

Political Ideology   Communism
European Affiliation   None
International Affiliation   None
Colours   Red, Yellow

Website   Trkiye Komnist Partisi

See also:
   Constitution of Turkey

Politics
Parliament
Government
President
Political parties
Elections
Contents [hide]
1 History
2 Issues of TKP
3 Program of TKP
4 See also
5 References
6 External links


[edit]
History

TKP is a party, which critically embraces the entire legacy of the leftist and revolutionary movement in Turkey. As a result, the history of TKP doesn't only consist of a narrow line, but we accept a broad range of movements, organizations and figures in the left as part of our history.

Early Years Although there were leftist and revolutionary groups in the Ottoman Empire, most of these were either divided along ethnic and religious lines or they were unable to develop into widespread mass organizations. In the aftermath of the WWI, at which Ottoman Empire suffered a definite and fatal defeat, working class organizations in major cities of Turkey started to get mobilized against the imperialist occupation. In the heat of the Liberation War, these organizations joint their forces and founded TKP in September 10 1920, in Baku, with the inspiration of the Great October Revolution. Immediately after its foundation, TKP was recognized as a member of Comintern. The founders of TKP, Mustafa Suphi (1881-1921) and his 14 comrades were massacred in January 1921 on orders of Mustafa Kemal, who gradually eliminated all of his political opponents and became the sole leader of the Turkish liberation movement. That terrifying event also marked the commencement of the illegal struggle of the party and revealed the bourgeois identity of Mustafa Kemal's movement. During 1920's and 1930's, when Republic of Turkey was emerging from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, TKP operated illegally. While the party enjoyed a significant popularity among the rapidly emerging proletariat, oppression by the regime and internal problems of the party hindered TKP to develop into a powerful organization. Still, many intellectuals, including the famous communist poet Nazim Hikmet (1903-1962), joined the lines of the party at that era and made important contributions to the revival of the communist movement in the following decades. However, we can't talk about a continuous history of the communist and revolutionary movement until 1960's.

1960's: A Strong Intervening Force: The Workers' Party of Turkey The Most important event of the 1960s was the foundation and political influence of the Workers' Party of Turkey (Trkiye i Partisi-TIP). Founded in the relatively liberated atmosphere of 1960's, TIP should also be considered as an offspring of the communist movement. By the joint efforts of labor unionists and leftist intellectuals, TIP became a mass organization in a short while. As early as 1965, TIP managed to get 3% of the votes and 15 seats in the parliament. Short after that, in 1967, Revolutionary Labor Unions' Confederation (DISK) was founded as a massive and revolutionary working class organization under the influence of TIP. In addition to that, TIP became the first political party, which put the Kurdish Question into its agenda. Meanwhile, TIP experiment also popularized the discussions of socialism and revolutions. Theoretical and political literature started to get translated en masse, enriching and inspiring the political discussions among leftists. A kind of dissociation took place in the ranks of the party and two strategic paths originated. The "socialist revolutionary" side advocated for a main role to be given to the proletariat in the revolution process while the "national democratic revolutionary" side claimed that the bourgeois revolutionary process in Turkey had not yet been completed and that this had to be the primary aim before the struggle for socialism. Although the socialist revolutionaries seemed more accurate in their arguments, neither side was on firm ideological ground. While these arguments were taking place, the political condition of Turkey was becoming increasingly fragile. This atmosphere led the student movement to engage in armed struggle against Turkey's ruling class, and to alienate from TIP. TIP was also unable to lead the working class movement. In 1970, upon a decision by the parliament to ban DISK, hundreds of thousands of workers marched to Istanbul and occupied the city for two days. Its political and ideological confusion and indecisiveness of TIP hindered it to assume the leadership of this proletarian uprising. A significant conclusion to be drawn from this event was that the proletariat in Turkey was ripe enough to lead a socialist revolution. On March 12, 1971, a coup d'tat was staged against the strengthening of the working class and the leftist movement, putting an end to TIP as a legal party. In early 1970s, various small militant groups accelerated the armed struggle. While revolutionary leaders like Deniz Gezmis, Mahir Cayan and Ibrahim Kaypakkaya were murdered and defeated, these early experiences of armed struggle inspired the mass armed revolutionary organizations of late 1970s.

1970's: Birth of "Socialist Power" Mobilizing the cadres of the banned TIP, TKP started "the leap" of 1973. In a few years TKP became an influential illegal party with semi-legal mass organizations and it was also masterminding DISK. In addition to that TIP (refounded in 1974) and TSIP (Socialist Workers' Part of Turkey) were struggling legally, while Dev Yol (Revolutionary Path) and Kurtulus (Liberation) emerged as massive armed organizations. Parallel to the strengthening of the left, the bourgeoisie assumed a contra-guerrilla war centered on paramilitary gangs and fascist MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), with high points like the assault on May 1 1977, at which over 30 people were murdered during the May Day Parade on Taksim Square in Istanbul. As a result of the continuous attacks by fascists, left organizations assumed an "anti-fascist" struggle, alienating themselves from the revolutionary struggle. While the main tendency in Turkey's left supported the social democratic CHP (Republican People's Party) in the name of gathering forces against fascism, opposition started to rise from the inside of many organizations and to form splits, which criticized the major movements from a revolutionary perspective. One of these splits was Socialist Power (Sosyalist Iktidar), which left TIP in 1978.

1980's: Death and Rebirth of Left In 1979, Socialist Power started to be published as a monthly journal, which lasted until the military coup in 1980. The military coup in 1980 with its pure anti-communist and anti-working class character can be considered a breaking point for the left in Turkey. While leftist organizations were unable to resist against the strikes by the military dictatorship, the dissolving of Eastern Block and Soviet Union accelerated the liquidation of the leftist organizations. By early 1990s, none of the major leftist organizations of 1970's were intact. After the military coup in 1980, following an organizational period, some former cadres of Socialist Power decided to publish a theoretical journal called Gelenek (Tradition) in 1986, which is still the theoretical publication of the Communist Party of Turkey. The decision was made with the perspective that the needs of the communist movement at the time pointed to a theoretical, ideological and political reproduction of Leninist principles with regard of present conditions in Turkey. This would in turn form the basis for the creation of new cadres for the communist movement. Gelenek also served the purpose of being a transitional bridge between the experiences of the international communist movement and the new cadres of the communist movement in Turkey. Such a role was especially important during the dissolution of the USSR and the continuation of the dreadful ideological assault on socialism. Actually the results of the same ideological assault was the main reason for the decision of the cadres of Gelenek to found an open and legal party following a period of intense discussion in Turkey's left concerning so-called unification. The party that was established was the "Party for Socialist Turkey" (Sosyalist Turkiye Partisi-STP), founded on November 7, 1992. The program of this party insisted on revolutionary, creative and "orthodox" politics, while the Turkish left in general was demoralized. After the Constitutional Court banned STP upon an article in its program regarding the Kurdish people, the Party for Socialist Power (Sosyalist ktidar Partisi-SIP) was founded in 1993. SIP aimed to organize all people devoted to four principles in order to socialize as a communist party: Anti-imperialism, collectivism (as opposed to privatization), the defense of enlightenment principles against Islamic fundamentalism, and independency from the capitalist order and its institutions. The claim of theoretical creativity and ideological casting led the party to force two important areas: Universities and trade unions. The achievements in these areas describe the position of our party today. Universities have become strongholds of the socialist struggle, while the ideological dominance of capitalism in trade unions was obstructed by a campaign called "Not a farm, a syndicate for the working class!" 1990's were marked by neo-liberal assaults from all sides. While almost all public investments were privatized, labor unions were fading away. A rotten and degenerated culture was imposed by the bourgeoisie, as imperialism was deepening its impact on society. Meanwhile, Islamic fundamentalists, who were supported during 1980's by the military regime to replace and wipe out the ideological influence of the left, were getting more powerful, institutionalized and aggressive. In July 1993, a mob provoked by Islamic fundamentalists put a hotel in the inner Anatolian city Sivas in fire, murdering 35 intellectuals, who were there for a festival. Throughout 1990's SIP enforced a unique political line, confronting all faces of bourgeoisie from Islamists to secularist, revealing their links, and promoting socialism as a current alternative. In 1990's, parallel to the impasse in which the system found itself concerning the Kurdish question, a crisis emerged. In 1994, the national elections were boycotted by leftist parties as a gesture of support against the oppressive measures faced by the Kurdish party DEP. SIP participated in the general elections in 1995 forming an electoral block with the Kurdish movement and other leftist parties. The coalition was named the Labor-Peace-Freedom Block, and received over 5% of the vote in Turkey. This block was instrumental in introducing class character and the communist line to the Kurdish masses. This was the first election experiment of the party. In 1999, SIP participated alone in the elections and got around 39 thousand votes. In 1990's SIP confronted imperialism from various dimensions, struggling against the USA, EU, IMF and NATO simultaneously. In contrast with some leftists groups, SIP considered the European Union as an imperialist organization and revealed the dark face behind its hollow promises. In 2000, SIP initiated a widespread campaign for the repatriation of the communist poet Nazim Hikmet and collected over 500 thousand signatures. This campaign not only intended to broaden the public basis of the party, but it was also an initial attempt to promote the communist identity embodies in the popular figure of Nazim Hikmet. Another significant campaign at that time was the "People's Memorandum" in 2001, which was an attempt to propagate the basic socialist demands among public. Looking from a broad historical perspective, 1990's and early 2000s were the transition period from a narrow cadre organization to a mass political party for our movement, and in this era our movement gained significant experience in developing and popularizing socialist policies. SIP also played an important role in the weakening of ideological degenerations in left like left liberalism, Trotskyism and left nationalism.

2001: The Communist Party of Turkey
 
9th Congress(2009)

The period stretching from the foundation of the STP, then SIP, to the year 2001, was also a process of the formation and organization of the Communist Party of Turkey, in all three ways: ideologically, politically and theoretically. SIP fought against the anti-communist hysteria propagated by forces of capitalism in Turkey and struggled in order to form the ideological and organizational basis of a communist party throughout the working classes of Turkey, while the party itself inwardly changed in essence not formally, but actually. As early as 1995, at its first congress, SIP made the decisions to assume its real name, "communist", as early as possible. In 2000, while the name of the party newspaper was changed from Socialist Power to Communist, KP (Communist Party) was founded with 30 members as an intermediary phase on the way to TKP. In 2001, everything was ready for the establishment of the Communist Party of Turkey. With the 6th Congress of the party, the name "Party for Socialist Power" changed to "Communist Party of Turkey", despite the still existing ban in Turkish law forbidding the establishment of a political party with a name including the word "communist" in its title. Communist Party of Turkey was not a direct organizational and political continuation of the former TKP, but claimed to include its legacy and experience in its roots, among the legacy of the all revolutionary movement in Turkey. TKP participated at the elections held on November 2002, with its own identity, thus including the word "communist" in its title. After an intensive election campaign, which propagated the communist identity and socialist policies, the party got around 60 thousand votes. Communist Party of Turkey knew that the voting preferences of the Turkish and Kurdish people depended on many factors other than ideological support. The real support for TKP was in fact many times more than the voting percentage reflected. In 2003, TKP mobilized all its forces and founded the Committees against the Occupation in Iraq) against the imperialist war plans against. As a result of the struggle of TKP and other leftist organizations, hundreds of thousands of people got mobilized against the war and Turkey's participation in it, and hindered the pass of the decree allowing the USA to use Turkey's territories for troop deployment in Iraq. When it was determined that a NATO Summit would be held in Istanbul in June 2004, TKP mobilized all its forces to hinder the summit. While Committees against Occupation were founded at many factories, high schools, universities and neighborhoods, TKP also utilized the municipal elections in March 2004 to mobilize people against NATO and increased its electoral support to over 85 thousand votes. The mass rallies against NATO on June 2004 not only showed TKP's success in mobilizing masses against NATO, but they also revealed the central role TKP started to play in Turkey's left.

[edit]
Issues of TKP

European Union
TKP is strictly and unconditionally against Turkey's membership into European Union and regards it as an imperialist organization. TKP reveals the dichotomy of EU's hollow promises about "democracy" and "human rights" and informs the public about the mechanisms of economic exploitation and political submission embodied in EU. TKP also struggles against the neo-liberal policies implemented by the government as part of the integration to the EU and propagates socialism as an alternative to EU.

NATO
TKP considers NATO as a brutal, militaristic tool in the hand of imperialist and defends canceling Turkey's membership to NATO. While NATO still keeps its anti-communist nature, more and more it is used by the USA to expand and strengthen its hegemony on the world, to threaten sovereign countries and to involve other NATO members like Turkey in its bloody imperialist adventures. TKP mobilized all its forces against the NATO Summit in Istanbul on June 2004 and will continue to struggle against NATO presence in Turkey and in the region

Iraq
TKP opposed the war in Iraq from the beginning on and utilized all its forces in 2003 to mobilize people in Turkey against the war. In 2003, TKP not only struggled against the occupation of a neighboring country by imperialists, but it also contributed to the prevention of Turkey's involvement into the war, with its troops or with its logistical support to the USA. Today TKP still warns the people about the government's continuing attempts to send troops to Iraq, while revealing the capitalists, which support the imperialist occupation by doing business in Iraq.

Cyprus
TKP stands for a united, independent Cyprus and believes that this can be only achieved in socialism. While TKP rejects nationalist arguments for dividing the island and demands the withdrawal of all foreign troops including Turkish, Greek and British troops, it also opposes the EU membership of Cyprus, stressing that imperialists, who have the primary responsibility in the current situation of the island, cannot bring peace to Cyprus.

Fundamentalism
TKP considers Islamic fundamentalists as a counter-revolutionary force serving the interests of Turkey's bourgeoisie and imperialists. In Turkey, Islamic fundamentalism was raised as an assault force against leftist and revolutionaries in 1960's, and after the military coup in 1980, they were supported by the military to erase the impact of revolutionaries among laborers. In 1990's Islamists continued their assaults against leftist, the most brutal example being the murder of 35 intellectuals in Sivas in 1993. While TKP struggles against Islamic fundamentalism at political and ideological level, it also reveals their links with bourgeoisie and military.

AKP
AKP (Party of Justice and Development), which is the party in government since the elections in 2002, is a loyal servant of imperialism and obedient representative of bourgeoisie. While being organically part of bourgeoisie, AKP managed to get the votes of laborers with lies and empty promises and it became the first party in power without a coalition since early 1990s. Although AKP's roots are in Islamic fundamentalist movement, it doesn't hesitate to collaborate with the USA, to submit Turkey to EU and to strengthen Turkey's dependency on NATO. While TKP reveals the collaborationist character of AKP, it also struggles against the Islamist discourse of AKP at ideological level.

Neo-liberalism
In the struggle against neo-liberalism, TKP intends to go beyond resistance and organize a counter-attack. Presenting socialism as the only valid alternative against the "New World Order" imposed by imperialists and capitalists, TKP fights against neo-liberalism both at ideological and political level. The process of neo-liberalization started in Turkey after the military coup in 1980, upon which an intensive wave of privatization and anti-labor policies shook the country. TKP argues that the neo-liberal assaults can only defeated by a strong working class movement with a clear socialist perspective.

Working Class Movement
Creating a new working class movement is among the priorities of TKP. While the new methods of capitalist production make the labor unions an insufficient platform for creating an effective working class movement, transforming the "yellow" unions to "red" ones and eliminating the rotten bureaucracy at labor unions is an important first step on the way to creating a working class movement, which embraces all laborers of the country. To do so, TKP created the Workers' Council consisting of labor unionists, intellectuals and vanguard workers, which is intended to produce strategies and coordination on the way of creating a working class movement.

Women Laborers
TKP doesn't consider women's problems as being apart from the class struggle. With this perspective, TKP organized the Laborer Women's Committees, which aim to organize and mobilize especially the women, who do housework or don't have a specified working place. In addition to politicizing women laborers, Laborer Women Committees also struggle against the ideological and political assaults by the bourgeoisie, such as covering the class dimension of women's problems.

Kurdish Issue
Standing for the fraternity of the peoples in Turkey, TKP considers itself as the party of Kurdish and Turkish proletariat. Since the oppression of Kurdish people is a direct result of capitalist system, the salvation of Kurdish people cannot be separated from the salvation of the Turkish proletariat. While TKP struggles against nationalist and racist attitudes towards Kurdish people, it also denounces Kurdish nationalism. Especially after the dissolving of Soviet Union, like many other national liberation movements, the mainstream Kurdish movement started to shift right. TKP struggles against the subaltern nationalism, which gives priority to the national question over class struggle, and builds up the common march of Kurdish and Turkish laborers towards socialism.

Universities
TKP considers the struggle at the universities as an essential part of the general struggle for socialism. Since universities are crucial to meet the ideological needs of the bourgeoisie, they are important platforms of ideological and political struggle for communists. Student branch of TKP aims to defeat the ideological impact of the bourgeoisie on universities, stand against the privatization on commercialization of universities and to hinder the universities from being used by NATO, EU and imperialists in general. TKP also formed the University Councils consisting of students, academicians and university laborers at many universities, in order to give voice to the demands of communists at universities. It is important to note that student branch of TKP gives priority to linking the struggle at universities to the broader struggle for socialism and to establish ties between the problems at universities and capitalist system.

High Schools
Communist Party of Turkey has also been active in the high schools of the country, organizing the youth of Turkey which has been systematically forced into isolation from politics in the wake of the 1980 military coup. Under the banner of "the School and Country" a name symbolizing the inseparable nature of these two areas and emphasizing the importance of politicization, high school students frequently come together for debates, various activities such as photograph exhibitions and slide shows depicting relevant current issues such as war and imperialism. The heightening of political awareness among the youth of Turkey is seen as an imperative in the struggle for socialism by the Communist Party of Turkey.

Internationalism
TKP gives priority to reproducing the struggle for socialism at international level. While TKP believes that socialism can only be achieved through the struggles of communist and revolutionary organizations in each separate country, it considers international solidarity and collaboration as an important component of the struggle for socialism. Thus TKP is in contact with communist and revolutionary organizations from all over the world. Giving priority to regional collaboration, TKP supports Balkan Anti-NATO Center (BAN-C) and develops close ties with the communist parties of neighboring countries. Further on, TKP expresses its full support to socialist countries like Cuba, and Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Accordingly, TKP supported the foundation of Jos Mart Association for Friendship with Cuba in Turkey, which aims to inform the public about the gains of socialism in Cuba. Meanwhile, the student branch of TKP is a member of World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and it organized the "International Anti-Imperialist Youth Camp" together with WFDY in June 2004. In addition to that TKP hosted two international conferences in February and June about the struggle against NATO.
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Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (Turkey)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  (Redirected from Marxist-Leninist Communist Party)Marxist-Leninist Communist Party
Marksist-Leninist Komnist Partisi

Leader   Leadership of the party is unknown.
Founded   September 1994
Headquarters   None (Illegal Organisation)
Ideology   Communism,
Anti-Revisionist
Marxism-Leninism,
Hoxhaism
International affiliation   None
Website
http://www.mlkp.info/


Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (Marksist-Leninist Komnist Partisi in Turkish, abbreviated as MLKP) is an underground Anti-Revisionist Marxist-Leninist and Hoxhaist communist party in Turkey.Contents [hide]
1 History
2 Organisation
3 Designation as a Terrorist Organisation
4 Human Resources
5 References
6 External links
7 See also


[edit]
History

MLKP was formed in September 1994, through the unification of Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist - Hareketi (TKP/ML-Hareketi) and Communist Workers Movement of Turkey (TKH). TKP/ML-Hareketi was the larger of the two. Both groups came from the pro-Albanian camp. The unity process of negotiations between the groups had started in 1989. Initially MLKP called itself 'MLKP-Kurulu' (MLKP-Foundation).
 
MLKP banner

In September 1995, at the first congress of MLKP-K, the Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (New Build-Up Organization) (TKP/ML (Y)) merged into the party, and the name was changed to MLKP.

Later the same year a split occurred, and the Communist Party - Build-up Organization (KP-) was formed.

[edit]
Organisation

The youth wing of MLKP is called the Communist Youth Organization (Komnist Genlik rgt in Turkish, abbreviated as KG).

The organisation has had three periodicals: Atlm (The Leap) (or Yeni Atlm (The New Leap)), a daily news bulletin, Partinin Sesi (The Voice of the Party), an institutional publication and Teoride Dorultu (The Direction in Theory), a theoretical-political journal)[1]. The 26th and last issue of Teoride Dorultu was published in 2006[2].

[edit]
Designation as a Terrorist Organisation

The organisation is listed among the 12 active terrorist organisation in Turkey as of 2007 according to Counter-Terrorism and Operations Department of Directorate General for Security (Turkish police)[3].

[edit]
Human Resources

A study carried out by the Counter-Terrorism and Operations Department of Directorate General for Security over a sample of files about people convicted of being a terrorist under Turkish laws including 826 militants from the organisation and the three other currently active left-wing organisations (see reference 1) 65 % of the members are aged 14 to 25, 16,8 % 25 to 30 and 17,5 % are older than 30. University graduates make up 20,4 % of the members, high school graduates 33,5 %, secondary school graduates 14 %, primary school graduates 29,9 % and illiterates 1,9 % (while they have no sampled literate non-graduate members) [4].
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Kurdistan Workers' Party
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  (Redirected from Kurdistan Workers Party)Kurdistan Workers' Party
Partiya Karkern Kurdistan, (PKK)

The current PKK flag used since 2005
Dates of operation   1978-present
Leader   The current official leader is Murat Karayilan. Abdullah calan (also known as "Apo") was one of the founders.[1][2][3]
Motives   The creation of an independent socialist state of Kurdistan in parts of present Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Cultural and political rights for the Kurdish population in Turkey.[4]
Active region(s)   Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria
Ideology   Kurdish nationalism,
socialism
Status   Designated as Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US State Department[5][6]
Designated as Proscribed Group by the UK Home Office
Designated as terrorist group by EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.[7]
Size   As high as 90,000 in the early 1990s. Currently estimated at 3,000[8][9]-6,000[10]
Annual revenue   500 million Euros[11] donations (50-60m)[11]


The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkern Kurdistan or    ?? Parti Karkerani Kurdistan), best known as PKK (Kurdish language:   and also called KADEK, Kongra-Gel, and KGK[6]), is a separatist militant organization that is recognized as a terrorist group by the EU and USA[12] The group was founded in the late 1970s and led by Abdullah calan. The PKK's ideology is founded on revolutionary socialism and Kurdish nationalism. The PKK's goal has been to create an independent, socialist Kurdish state in Kurdistan, a geographical region that comprises parts of southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, northeastern Syria and northwestern Iran, where the Kurdish population is the majority. This goal has now been moderated to claiming cultural and political rights for the ethnic Kurdish population in Turkey.[1] Since 1978, the PKK has been engaged in armed conflict with the Turkish state.

The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization internationally by a number of states and organizations, including the United States,[6] United Nations,[13] NATO[13] and the European Union.[13][14] The organization is listed as one of the 12 active terrorist organizations in Turkey as of 2007 according to the Counter-Terrorism and Operations Department of the Turkish police.[15] Turkey labeled the organization as an ethnic secessionist organization that uses terrorism and the threat of force against both civilian[14][16] and military targets for the purpose of achieving its political goal.

Kurdish politician Abdlmelik Frat claims that Democratic Society Party (DTP) was founded by PKK, and that 80 percent of Kurds do not vote for this party.[17] However, senior DTP leaders maintain that they support a unified Turkey within a democratic framework. Aysel Tuluk published an article in Radikal in May 2007 as the co-president of DTP, to prove that claim.[18]Contents [hide]
1 Name
2 History
3 Ideology
4 Organization
4.1 Training camps
4.2 Political representation
5 Activities
5.1 1978-1984
5.2 1984-1999
5.3 1999-current
6 Tactics
6.1 Recruiting
6.2 Instruments
7 Resources
7.1 Funding
7.2 Human
7.3 International
8 Effects
8.1 Toll
9 Footnotes
10 References
11 External links


[edit]
Name

Despite the organization's self-declared name changes, names used by its branches, names of its front groups, and names used by vassal structures, the group is commonly referred as the PKK.

Late 1970s, the organization first deciphered by the intelligence community as "Apocus." Since then, the organization declared name changes without changing organizational structure, such as Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkern Kurdistan, PKK); Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan (Kurdish: Kongreya Azad  Demokrasiya Kurdistan, KADEK); Halu Meru Savunma Kuvveti (HSK). Organization established front groups including the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (Turkish: Krdistan zgrlk ahinleri), and (Kurdish: Teyrbazn Azadiya Kurdistan, TAK).

On 25 October 1987, the organization created the Youth Council of Kurdistan (YCK) to organize and recruit the young more systematically. This structure extended to branches: Free Youth Movement of Kurdistan (Kurdish: Tevgera Cwann Azad a Kurdistan, TECAK), the Independent Youth Movement in Turkey (Turkish: Bamsz Genlik Hareketi, BAGEH), Democratic Youth Movement in Iran, Independent Youth Movement in Iraq (TCM), Free Youth Movement in Syria (TCA), the Free Youth Movement (Turkish: zgr Genlik Hareketi, GH) in Europe and in the Commonwealth of Independent States.[19]

During this period, the organization used the front groups to claim responsibility for attacks against civilians. The organization adapted a decentralized structure to improve effectiveness and these branches adapted different names. [20] The armed wing active in south-east Turkey; the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (Kurdish: Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan, ARGK), the People's Defence Forces (Kurdish: Hzn Parastina Gel, HPG). The organization held a vassal or tenant to the major control over structures such as the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress, the Kurdistan People's Congress (KHK), and the People's Congress of Kurdistan. As of 30 April 2007, all the social arrangements, all the activities declared, using the listed names are classified as originating from the same organization (commonly known as the PKK) by the U.S. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism as published in Country Reports on Terrorism.[6]

[edit]
History
 
October 22, 2007, demonstration against the PKK in Kadky, Istanbul.
 
February 15, 2003, PKK supporters at the anti-war protest for the imminent invasion of Iraq in London.
Main article: History of the Kurdistan Workers Party

In the early 1970s, the organization's core group was made up largely of students led by Abdullah calan (nicknamed "Apo") in Ankara. The group soon moved its focus to large Kurdish population in south-east Turkey. On November 27, 1978, the group adapted the name "Kurdistan Workers Party." The organization took part in the conflict with right-wing entities with its communist ideology. In 1979, the organization as a propaganda of the deed attempted to assassinate Kurdish tribal leader Mehmet Celal Bucak who they claimed exploited the peasants, and collaborated with Turkey. This marked a period of intense urban warfare between other radical political elements. The 1980 Turkish coup d'tat pushed the organization to another stage with the members doing jail time, being subject to capital punishment, or fleeing to Syria. On November 10, 1980, the Turkish Consulate in Strasbourg, France was bombed in a joint operation by the ASALA and they claimed this was the start of a "fruitful collaboration."[21]

Starting in 1984, the organization transformed itself into a paramilitary organization using the training camps located in Syria and launched paramilitary attacks as well as continuing with the bombings against governmental installations, military and civilian targets, many of whom were connected to the Southeastern Anatolia Project. The organization moved to a less centralized form, taking up operations in a variety of European and Middle Eastern countries and became a trans-nationalized organization. Following the collapse of the USSR, the organization largely abandoned its Communist roots, attempting to better accommodate nationalistic views and Islamic beliefs.

Beginning with the mid 1990s, the organization lost the upper hand in its operations as a consequence of the declined state support in the post-Cold War shifts. In the mid 1990s, it also began to shift from conventional bombing to suicide bombing and launched 15 attacks which 11 were performed by a female. In the late 1990s, Turkey increased the pressure and the undeclared war between Turkey-Syria ended the Syrian open support. In 1999, calan was captured, prosecuted and sentenced to death, but later commuted to life imprisonment as part of European Union membership.[22] With downgraded security concerns, the Turkish parliament began a controlled process of dismantling the legal control, using the term "normalization" or "rapprochement" depending on the sides of the issue. The ban on broadcasting was lifted in 2000s, which the publishing side of this 1983 ban on use of Kurdish language was already lifted in 1991.[23] At the sometime, the organization blacklisted in many countries. On April 2, 2004, the Council of the European Union added the organization to its list of terrorist organisations. Later that year, the US Treasury moved to freeze assets of branches of the organization. The organization went through a series of changes and unilateral truce declared by the organization ended in 2003.[24]

Since Post-invasion Iraq, 2003–present, according to Turkey, Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish region in northern Iraq, and US forces have not done enough to combat with the organization and secure the Iraqi-Turkish border, causing tensions between the Iraqi and Turkish governments.[25][26] PKK Guerilla army

[edit]
Ideology
 
Former flag displaying the soviet hammer and sickle

The organization originated in the 1970s from the radical left and drew its leaders, members from other existing leftist groups, mainly Dev-Gen.[20]:127 The organization initially presented itself as part of the communist revolution. The organization's aims and objectives have evolved over time.

During 1980s, the organization was a secular insurgent political movement.[20]:127 During 1980s the organization included and cooperated with other ethnic groups, including ethnic Turks, who were following the radical left. Following the collapse of the USSR, the communist roots were largely abandoned in an attempt to better accommodate nationalistic views and Islamic beliefs.

The organization emerged from the Workers Party of "Kurdistan" heritage. Initially the group aimed to establish a Kurdish nation separate from Turkey. Later this goal extended to Syria, Iraq and Iran. In recent years, organization fundamentally transformed from a party of Kurdistan to a party of Turkey.[20]:129 The profound shift implied a recognition of national sovereignty of "Republic of Turkey," within which the claim is made for regional autonomy, rather than a fight for national independence.[20]:129 This positional change was criticized as a method change rather than a real ideological change.

In 1999, following the capture of Ocalan, organization announced a "peace initiative," and spoken more often about cultural or linguistic rights[6]. The group's hard-line militant wing took control and renounced the self-imposed cease-fire with the turn of 2004.[6] Besides the activities towards Turkey, on 17 July 2005, one of the chief executive Hasan zen was murdered in Austria. Hasan zen wanted to leave the organization. In Diyarbakir, on 6 July 2005, the organization killed Hikmet Fidan former founder of the legal branch the People’s Democratic Party (HADEP). Hikmet Fidan tried to formed an alternative organization called PWD with Osman Ocalan.

Currently, it is labeled as an ethnic secessionist organization.

[edit]
Organization

The PKK has multiple heads in various West European countries.[27] However, Abdullah calan (1984-1999) was unchallenged leader of the organization. After the capture of calan, authorities induced him to publicly plead for a ceasefire and for his own life at the court, which diminished his stature and credibility.[28] Though serving life imprisonment, calan is still considered the honorary leader and figure-head of the organization. He directs the PKK from his prison cell, through his lawyer.[29]

Murat Karayilan has the control of the organization in practice, although undergone numerous conflicts between Cemil Bayik. Cemil Bayik beside Abdullah Ocalan, Kesire Yildirim Ocalan, and Hakki Karaer was one of the core leaders. Cemil Bayik’s military skills and leadership were criticized by Abdullah Ocalan during his 1999 trial. The organization appointed "Doctor Bahoz," the nom de guerre of Fehman Huseyin, a Syrian Kurd, in charge of the movement's military operations signifying the long-standing alliance between the organization and Damascus.[30]

[edit]
Training camps
 
A PKK militant patrols the border.

The first training camp was established than in Syrian controlled Bekaa Valley in 1982, with the support of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Syria.[31][32] This main camp moved to north Iraq in 1998, under intensive pressure, after the Syria expelled Ocalan and shut down all camps established in the region.[32] The organization moved its training camps to North Iraq where there was a vacuum of control after the Operation Provide Comfort. Instead one big training camp which could be easily destroyed, organization established many small camps. During this period organization set up a fully functioning enclave with training camps, storage facilities, and reconnaissance and communications centers.

In 2007 organization believed to have a number of camps strung out through the mountains that straddle the border between Turkey and Iraq, including in Sinaht, Haftanin, Kanimasi and Zap.[33] The organization has two types of camps, the border camps that were used as forward bases from which militants infiltrate into Turkey. The units deployed there are highly mobile and the camps have only the minimum infrastructure.[33] The camps in the Qandil Mountains have a more developed infrastructure—including a field hospital, electricity generators and a large proportion of the PKK's lethal and non-lethal supplies.[33]

There are also training camps in other countries, the organization's training camp which was deep in the woods and indiscernible was dismantled near Eindhoven in the Netherlands and following raids resulted arrests and seize of materials in The Hague, Rotterdam, Eindhoven and Capelle aan den IJssel.[34] There was another training camp at Belgium, which the organization uses training camps in Europe for political and ideological training.[35]

[edit]
Political representation

The organization had sympathizer parties in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey beginning in early 1990s. The establishment of direct links to the organization has been a question. In sequence HEP/DEP/HADEP/DEHAP and the latest Democratic Society Party (DTP) have been accused of sympathizing with the PKK, since they have refused to brand it as a terrorist group. As of June 2007 report by the European Union Institute for Security Studies stated that "It is an obvious secret that DTP is connected to PKK in a way and PKK is a terrorist group."[36]

Political organizations established in Turkey are banned from propagating or supporting separatism. Several political parties supporting Kurdish rights have been banned on this pretext. The constitutional court claimed to find direct links between the HEP/DEP/HADEP and the PKK. IN 2008 the DTP-party was prosecuted by the constitutional court.

Several parliamentarians and other elected representatives have been jailed for speaking in Kurdish, carrying Kurdish colors or otherwise "promoting separatism", most famous among them being Leyla Zana.[37]

[edit]
ActivitiesActivities of the Kurdistan Workers Party by Region[38][39]
Target   Activity Category   Turkey   Northern
Iraq   Western
Europe
Government   Demonstrations/Protests[38]         
Riots[38]         
Kidnapping[38]         
Assassination[38]         
Sabotage[38]         
Chemical warfare[notes 1]         
Bombing
Attacks[38]   Post/Train/Power         
Police         
Outposts         
Armed
Attacks[38]   Military         
Police         
Village Guards         
Civilian   Kidnapping[38]         
Assassination[38]         
Bombing
Attacks   Villages         
Touristic Facilities[38]         
Commercial Units[38]         
Organized Crime   Extortion[40]         
Drug Trafficking[41]   Transit   Transit   Destination
Human Trafficking[41]   Origin   Origin   


During its establishment in the mid 1970s, amid violent clashes in the whole of Turkey, organization used classic terrorism methods, such as failed assassination of Mehmet Celal Bucak as a propaganda-of-the-deed.[20] After the 1980 military coup the organization developed into a paramilitary organization using resources it acquired in Bekaa valley in part of ex-Syrian-controlled Lebanon. After 1984, PKK began to use Maoist theory of people's war.[42][43] There are three phases in this theory. The militant base during the initial years was coming from different sources, so the first two phases were diffused to each other.

[edit]
1978-1984

In the first phase (1978-1984), the PKK tried to gain the support of the population. It attacked the machinery of government and distributed propaganda in the region. PKK tactics were based on ambush, sabotage, riots, protests, and demonstrations against the Turkish government. PKK has also been accused of violent attacks on individual civilians or residential areas (Kurds and non-Kurds alike), who refused to co-operate with the PKK or were suspected of collaborating with the Turkish authorities. During these years, the PKK fought a turf war against other predominantly Kurdish organisations in Turkey. The PKK effectively used the prison force to gain appeal among the population.[44][45] In the whole Turkey, this period was characterized by violent clashes which culminated in the 1980 military coup.

During this time, the organization argued that its violent actions were explained by the need to defend Kurds in the context of what it considered as the massive cultural suppression of Kurdish identity (including the 1983 Turkish Language Act Ban) and cultural rights carried out by other governments of the region.

[edit]
1984-1999

In the second phase (1984-1999), which followed the return of civilian rule in 1983, escalating attacks were made on the government's military and vital institutions all over the country. The objective was to destabilise Turkish authority through a long, low-intensity confrontation. In addition to skirmishing with Turkish military and police forces and local village guards, the PKK has conducted suicide bombing on government and police installations, as well as at local tourist sites. Kidnapping and assassination against government officials and Kurdish tribal leaders who were named as puppets of the state were performed as well. Widespread sabotages were continued from the first stage. PKK performed kidnapping western tourists, primarily in Istanbul but also at different resorts. Its actions have taken place mainly in Turkey and against Turkish targets in other countries, although it has on occasions co-operated with other Kurdish nationalist paramilitary groups in neighboring states, such as Iraq and Iran.[46] PKK has also attacked Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities across Western Europe. In effect, the Turkish state has led a series of counter-insurgency operations against the PKK, accompanied by political measures, starting with an explicit denunciation of separatism in the 1982 Constitution, and including proclamation of the state of emergency in various PKK-controlled territories starting in 1983 (when the military relinquished political control to the civilians). This series of administrative reforms against terrorism included in 1985 the creation of village guard system by the then prime minister Turgut zal who is of partial Kurdish descent.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, in an effort to win increased support from the Kurdish peasantry, the PKK altered its leftist secular ideology to better accommodate and accept Islamic beliefs. The group also abandoned its previous strategy of attacking Kurdish civilians, focusing instead on government and tourist targets.[47] In its campaign, the organization has been accused of carrying out atrocities against both Turkish and Kurdish civilians and its actions have been criticised by human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Actions of the Turkish state in the past have also been criticised by these same groups.

All in all, this low intensity conflict which has lasted more than thirty years has had a number of effects in the Turkish territory.

[edit]
1999-current

In the third phase (1999-current), after capture of calan, according to Maoist theory of people's war claims that the conventional fighting should be established to seize cities, overthrow the government and take control of the country. This stage has never achieved. In effect, after the capture of calan, activities of the organization never reached to previous levels.

Since the 1999, the organization begin to use improvised explosive devices rather than direct confrontation.

[edit]
Tactics

The areas in which the group operates are generally mountainous rural areas and dense urban areas. The mountainous terrain offers an advantage to members of the PKK by allowing them to hide in a network of caves and making military air operations, especially helicopter use, hazardous for the Turkish Armed Forces. While in urban areas, PKK members are often able to blend in with the local population.

[edit]
Recruiting

Organization with its Marxist ideology claim to generate equality of gender. At its establishment, included a small number of female militants, over time, however, this number has increased significantly and the early 1990s, 30 percent of its 17,000 armed militants were women.[48] The Civil Code in Turkey, established as Ataturk's reforms, has accepted men and women as equals since 1926, it was not possible to accomplish this ideal in practice for Kurdish rural areas where tribal structure and a male-dominant oppressive environment that considered women as second-class citizens. The organization increased its number of members through the recruitment of women from different social structures and environments, such as women from families that migrated to several European countries after 1960 as guest workers(German: Gastarbeiter).[48] It was reported that 88% of the subjects claimed that equality was a key objective, there was no equality within the organization.[49] In 2007, approximately 1,100 of 4,500-5,000 total members were women.[48]

The organization used children within its militant force.[50] 86% percent of who had joined the organization was to bolster their families incomes following offers that it would provide for their families in return.[49] All of the new recruites reported that these offers were not fulfilled.[49] 80% of those surveyed also reported that they had actively stopped other family members—usually younger brothers—from joining the organization too.[49] 60% of those surveyed had an education level below high school level.[49]

When asked why they stayed in the organization, two thirds stated that they were afraid of being caught as reprisals are not just limited to physical harm towards the militant; their families would be at risk as well.[49] Five percent said that it was from fear of punishment by the Republic of Turkey.[49]

[edit]
Instruments

In July 2007, the weapons captured between 1984-2007 from the PKK operatives and their origins published by the Turkish General Staff indicates that the operatives delete some of the serial numbers from their weapons. The total number of weapons and the origins for traceable ones were:[51]The choice & origin of the traceable weapons (July 2007)[51]
Type   Quantity   Sources
AK-47 Kalashnikovs   4,500   71.6% from the USSR, 14.7% from China, 3.6% from Hungary, 3.6% from Bulgaria
Rifles[notes 2]   5,713 of (959 traceable)   45.2% from Russia, 13.2% from United Kingdom, and 9.4% from United States.
rocket launchers   1,610 (313 traceable)   85% from Russia, 5.4% from Iraq, and 2.5% from China in origin.
pistol   2,885 (2,208 traceable)   21.9% from Czechoslovakia, 20.2% from Spain, 19.8% from Italy
grenade   3,490 (136 traceable)   72% from Russia, 19.8% from United States, 8% from Germany,
mines   11,568 (8,015 traceable)   60.8% from Italy, 28.3% from Russia, 6.2% from Germany


Four members of the organization, who handed themselves over to authorities after escaping from camps in northern Iraq, claimed they had seen two U.S. armored vehicles deliver weapons, which was widely reported and further stoked suspicions about U.S. policy in Iraq.[52] US envoy denied these claims.[53] The arms were claimed to be part of Blackwater Worldwide arms smuggling allegations. The probe of organization's weapons and the investigation of Blackwater employees were connected.[54]

The organization has been using mines.[55] Use of these mines has led to civilian deaths, in part due to accidental triggering by civilian trucks and buses rather than the intended military armoured vehicles.[55]

[edit]
Resources

[edit]
Funding

The organization's annual budget has been estimated at $500 million Euros. The PKK receives its funding in the form of private donations, from both organisations and individuals from around the world. Some of these supporters are Kurdish businessmen in south-eastern Turkey, sympathisers in Syria and Iran, and Europe. Parties and concerts are organized by branch groups.[56] Additionally, it is believed that the PKK earns money through the sale of various publications, as well as receiving revenues from legitimate businesses owned by the organization.[57] Besides affiliate organizations, there are sympathizer organizations such as the Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe (KON-KURD, headquartered in Brussels) and the International Kurdish Businessmen Union (KAR-SAZ, in Rotterdam) which constantly exchanges information and perform legitimate or semi-legitimate commercial activities and donations.

[edit]
Human

During its highest point in the early 1990s the militant membership was around 17000. After the capture of calan this number drastically decreased. The membership increased from 3,000 to more than 7,000 since 2003 invasion of Iraq. In 2008, according to information provided by the Intelligence Resource Program of the Federation of American Scientists the strength of the organization in terms of human resources consists of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 militants of whom 3,000 to 3,500 are located in northern Iraq.[58]

A study carried out by the Counter-Terrorism and Operations Department of Directorate General for Security over a sample of files about people convicted of being a terrorist under Turkish laws including 262 militants from the organization has found that 54% of the members are aged 14 to 25, 34% 26 to 37 and 12% 38 to 58. University graduates make up 11% of the members, high school graduates 16%, secondary school graduates 13%, primary school graduates 39%, literate non-graduates 12% and illiterates 9%.[59]

[edit]
International

At the height of its campaign, the organization received support from many countries. The level of support given has changed throughout this period.

Support of Syria,[56][60] From early 1979 to 1999 Syria had provided valuable safe havens to PKK in the region of Beqaa Valley. After the undeclared war between Turkey and Syria, Syria placed restrictions on PKK activity on its soil. Turkey is expecting positive developments in its cooperation with Syria in the long term, but even during the course of 2005, there were PKK operatives of Syrian nationality operating in Turkey.

Support of Iran;[61][page needed] Iran listed PKK as a terrorist organization after Iran's supply of resources to the PKK began to be used on its own soil. Iran provided PKK with supplies in the form of weapons and funds.

Support of Greece; retired Greek L.T. General Dimitris Matafias and retired Greek Navy Admiral Antonis Neksasis had visited organization's Mahsun Korkmaz base camp in Bakaa valley in October 1988 along with parliamentarians from the panhellenic Socialist movement (PASOK).[62] At the time it was reported that the general has assumed responsibility for training. Greeks also dispatched arms through Greek Cypriot administration.[62] In December 1993, Greek European affairs minister Theodore Pangaios was quoted saying "we must be supportive of the Kurdish people to be free".[63] Greece declined to join Germany and France and the eleven other members at the EU to ban the organization.[63] During the 1990s, Greece supplied the rebels.[64]

Support from the Republic of Cyprus was brought in question when Abdullah calan was caught with a Cypriot passport to the name of Mavros Lazaros, a nationalist reporter.

The support of paramilitary groups; The organization developed links with paramilitary groups among other ethnic groups which has harboured historic grievances against Turkey such as the ethnic Armenian ASALA,[65] as well as groups which shared its left-wing nationalist ideology such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation, ETA, and, to a lesser degree, the Provisional Irish Republican Army.[65] Through the large Kurdish immigration in Germany, it has also formed close contacts with violent left-wing political groups in that country.

Support of the Soviet Union;[66] According to the former KGB-FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko, who was poisoned in 2006, PKK's leader Abdullah Ocalan was trained by KGB-FSB.[67] As of 2008, Russia still is not among the states that list PKK as a terrorist group.

Support of the United Kingdom; TV broadcast for five years in UK, until its licence was revoked by the regulators Independent Television Commission (ITC) in 1999 due to a breach of ITC guidelines and perceived pro-PKK bias. In December 2008, the United Kingdom detained members of the PKK and seized the assets of the PKK's man in Britain, Selman Bozkur, alias “Dr. Hseyin”. The detainees are being questioned.[68]

Support of various Europe states; Despite Brussels designation of the organization as a terrorist organization, the EU continues to permit the broadcasting of organization's networks on the Hot Bird 3 satellite owned by the French company Eutelsat. MEDYA TV started transmissions from studios in Belgium via a satellite uplink from France. MEDYA TV's licence was revoked by the French authorities. A few weeks later Roj TV began transmissions from Denmark. It has also been argued that the Netherlands and Belgium have supported the PKK by allowing its training camps to function in their respective territories. On November 22, 1998, Hanover's criminal police reported that three children had been trained by the PKK for guerrilla warfare in camps in the Netherlands and Belgium.[69] After the death of Theo van Gogh, with increasing attention on domestic security concerns, the Dutch police raided the 'PKK paramilitary camp' in the Dutch town of Liempde and arrested 29 people in November 2004.[70] Denmark allows Kurdish satellite television stations (such as ROJ-TV), which Turkey claims has links with the PKK, to operate in Denmark and broadcast into Turkey.[71]

Various PKK leaders, including Hidir Yalcin, Riza Altun, Zubeyir Aydar, and Ali Haydar Kaytan all lived in Europe and moved freely. The free movement was archived by the strong ties with influential persons. Danielle Mitterrand, the wife of the former President of France, had active connections during the 90s with elements of the organization's leadership that force a down graded relationships between these states.[72] Ali Rza Altun, a suspected key figure with an Interpol arrest warrant in his name, after harboring him for some time Austria arranged a flight to Iraq.. Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gl summoned the Austrian ambassador and condemned Austria's action.[73] On September 30, 1995, While calan was at Syria, Damascus opened contact with high ranking German CDU MP Heinrich Lummer and German intelligence officials.

The Chief of the Turkish General Staff during 2007, General Yaar Bykant, stated that even though the international struggle had been discussed on every platform and even though organizations such as the UN, NATO, EU make statements of serious commitment, to this day the necessary measures had not been taken.[74] According to Bykant; "this conduct on one side has encouraged the terrorists, on the other side it assisted in widening their [the terrorists] activities. The most distressful part of it is that many of the European countries being a member of NATO, an organization that had announced that terrorism was the greatest threat to itself.[74]" Sedat Laciner, of the Turkish think tank ISRO, says that US support of the PKK undermines the US War on Terrorism.[75] Seymour Hersh claimed that the U.S. supported PEJAK, the Iranian branch of the PKK.[76] The head of the PKK's militant arm, Murat Karayilan, claimed that Iran attempted to recruit the PKK to attack coalition forces, adding that Kurdish guerrillas have launched a clandestine war in north-western Iran, ambushing Iranian troops.[77]

[edit]
Effects   This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unverifiable material may be challenged and removed. (October 2008)

Main article: Effects of the Kurdistan Workers Party

As a self-proclaimed Kurdish liberation organization, the PKK has cited "mass violence by the Turkish state on the Kurd identity" to justify its activities.[citation needed] The main goal of its activities was to alienate the people from the state by pushing security forces into more and more overt and repressive counter-measures. The Political-Justice section extends the results of this ideology and methods of the democratic processes and the justice system in Turkey. In a democratic system, an ideology that questions the state's legitimacy, will of its population and its security apparatus was difficult to be accepted as a political view, which was shaped under HEP/DEP/HADEP story. Turkish government authorities did not negotiate with the organization, so regional NGOs there were no communication channels between the sides. The ill-formed language ban of 1983 and Terrorism Act of 1991 were significant events. Also, amnesties were interesting events during the conflict time, as each amnesty gave more human resources to the organization. The prison as a rehabilitation concept was a failure. The people who were jailed for non-violent activities were becoming militants during their jail time. Government's military operations against the prisons were the highest point in this failure.

As a revolutionary left-wing organization, the PKK perceived Turkish society as one that was deformed by capitalism and imperialism. The PKK unleashed its aggression on enemies spanning all classes (farmers, business, etc.) and those that it considered puppets of the state. The cost of the PKK's actions are significant. PKK had drastic effects on regional economy, as targeted infrastructure of the region. Regions' inability to join the economical activities were associated with the work force, costs (insurance premiums, facility costs, loss of trained personnel etc.), and productivity (loss of work time, travel restrictions, inability to move rapidly etc). The region has had a very high historical tourism potential and it has been dormant because of the terrorism threat for many years.

The integration into social and economical activities are developed within the education system. Educational activities were targeted by the PKK. Because the majority of the people are very resilient to the effects of political violence, young people form a high risk group because of their undeveloped personalities. The effects of political violence on the newer generations is an important issue because, at the moment, the new generation in areas affected by the conflict have no experience living under what would be considered normal conditions.

This conflict became part with the negotiations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) about its eventual integration to the EU.

[edit]
Toll
Further information: Turkey–Kurdistan Workers Party conflict

More than 37,000 people have died since the beginning of the PKK's armed struggle in 1984.[78] According to Denise Natali, the Turkish Armed Forces have destroyed some 8000 Kurdish communities and created 3 to 4 million refugees in the process.[79]

According to Chief of the Turkish General Staff, until September 2008:[10]
32,000 PKK members have been killed and 14,000 have been captured alive.
6,482 Turkish soldiers and security officials have been killed.
5,560 civilians have been killed.

According to Kendal Nezan's article published in July 1998 in Le Monde diplomatique, the conflict has weighed heavily on the Turkish state's budget.[80] In 1993, a sum of $70m was allocated from the prime minister’s secret funds. According to government inspector Kutlu Sava, this sum was used mainly for procuring weapons and anti-terrorist equipment from Israel and for external operations. Irregular units in the conflictual zones have had to find ways to finance themselves, including racketeering and secret funding. The details of state-sanctioned criminal activities were revealed in the wake of the Susurluk scandal. Sedat Bucak has been alleged by Kendal Nezan to have under his orders 20,000 men, while the village guards pro-government Kurdish militias created in the mid-1980s would number to a total of 64,000.

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Re: Турция
« Ответ #1 : 19/09/12 , 00:02:22 »
В Турции курдов-журналистов судят за малейшие упоминания о РПК



В Турции на скамье подсудимых оказалось сорок четыре журналиста. Их обвиняют в поддержке запрещенной в Турции Рабочей партии Курдистана (РПК) и подрывной пропаганде государства.
Адвокаты утверждают, что их клиенты выполняли свои профессиональные обязанности. Они заявляют, что власти начали наступление на независимую прессу.
Все подсудимые – курды. Юристы обнаружили в их делах много эпизодов, не имеющих никакого отношения к терроризму и сепаратизму. Так, одного из журналистов обвиняют в том, что он рассказал о случаях сексуального домогательства в крупнейшей национальной авиакомпании Turkish Airlines.
Среди «преступлений» также интервью с лидером курдской партии «Мир и демократия» Селахаттином Демирташем и сообщение о потерях в ходе столкновений между правительственными войсками и боевиками РПК.

http://www.narpolit.com/what/kurd_zhurnalist_%E2%80%93_eto_terrorist_07-42-41.htm

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Re: Турция
« Ответ #2 : 19/01/13 , 21:53:09 »

В Турции в результате спецоперации против запрещенной коммунистической организации задержаны 85 человек




   
http://korrespondent.net/world/1478419-v-turcii-v-rezultate-specoperacii-protiv-zapreshchennoj-kommunisticheskoj-organizacii-zaderzhany-85-chelo


Турецкая полиция сегодня, 18 января, арестовала 85 человек, подозреваемых в причастности к запрещенной макрсистской группировке Революционный народно-освободительный фронт (DHKP-C).


Спецоперация по задержанию прошла в семи провинциях страны с использованием вертолетов.


Среди задержанных оказались как предполагаемые члены группировки, так и 15 адвокатов.


По данным СМИ, их подозревают в передаче инструкций от лидеров DHKP-C, которые находятся за решеткой, активистам на свободе. При этом девять из задержанных адвокатов являются членами ассоциации юристов Progressive Lawyers Association (CHD), которая традиционно защищает интересы леворадикальных активистов.


В заявлении на сайте CHD операцию называют "полицейским террором". По мнению юристов, таким образом власти пытаются избавиться от всех инакомыслящих и тем самым угрожают демократии и свободе.


DHKP-C объявлена террористической организацией властями Турции, США и Евросоюза. Группировке приписывают осуществление терактов против военных и политиков с 1970-х годов. Активисты DHKP-C выступают против членства Турции в НАТО, а также осуждают "западный империализм".

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Re: Турция
« Ответ #3 : 02/02/13 , 21:00:27 »

20:37, 2 февраля 2013
Турецкие радикалы взяли ответственность за взрыв в Анкаре



Активисты группировки «Революционный народно-освободительный фронт»
Фото: Osman Orsal / Reuters


Незаконная турецкая группировка «Революционный народно-освободительный фронт» (DHKP-C) взяла ответственность за теракт у посольства США в Анкаре, сообщает Reuters.


Взрыв у американской дипмиссии в турецкой столице осуществил в пятницу, 1 февраля, террорист-смертник, 40-летний член группировки Эджевит Шанлы, турок по национальности. В результате погиб он сам и охранник посольства, тоже гражданин Турции. Еще несколько человек получили ранения. Зданию дипмиссии причинен незначительный ущерб.


Между тем власти Турции объявили в субботу вечером, что в Стамбуле и Анкаре задержаны трое подозреваемых в причастности к организации теракта у посольства США. Какие-либо прочие подробности пока неизвестны.


Что касается Эджевита Шанлы, то он уже попадал в поле зрения турецких властей. В 1997 году он был осужден за террористическую деятельность и членство в «Революционном народно-освободительном фронте». За решеткой он присоединился к масштабной голодовке заключенных, после которой с ним случилось психическое расстройство. Спустя четыре года он вышел на свободу.


Группировка DHKP-C, действующая с конца 1970-х годов и придерживающаяся марксистско-ленинской идеологии, объявлена террористической организацией властями Турции, США и Евросоюза. Ранее «Революционный народно-освободительный фронт» неоднократно брал ответственность за нападения и убийства иностранных граждан и военнослужащих в Турции.


http://lenta.ru/news/2013/02/02/responsbility/

Оффлайн Ashar1

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Re: Турция
« Ответ #4 : 02/02/13 , 21:09:59 »
У каждого народа есть свои герои и пассионарии

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Re: Турция
« Ответ #5 : 04/06/13 , 11:19:11 »
"Правительство – в отставку!"

Уход сил полиции с площади Taksim, с того место, где люди несколько дней подряд оказывали сопротивление, не может рассматриваться ни как признак проявления доброй воли со стороны правительства, ни как повод для праздника на нашей улице.


http://rkrp-rpk.ru/images/stories/tkp_resim_123.jpg height=533


Наш народ победил полицейский террор. Нам нельзя останавливаться на этом. Чиновники, которые душили весь город слезоточивым газом, офицеры полиции, которые продолжали атаковать (протестующих), даже при отступлении с площади Taksim, должны быть призваны к ответу. Более того, нас следует еще усилить борьбу, чтобы призвать к ответу за их действия и операции за последние 11 лет (все) правительство. С этой точки зрения лозунг: «Таййп – в отставку!», который сейчас скандируют на улицах по всей Турции, имеет смысл и является вполне актуальным.
Это – голоса людей, протестующих против жестокости полиции, которая встречается в Турции повсеместно, а особенно в Анкаре.
Эти голоса опровергнут противоречивые заявления правительства, касающиеся будущего парка Gezi в (районе) Таксим, и проложат путь к освобождению не только (района) Таксим но всей нашей страны.

 Сегодня улицы должны заполниться морем людей. Коммунистическая Партия Турции приглашает всех жителей Стамбула принять участие в акциях протеста на площади Таксим и в массовых протестах, проходящих в других городах.
 
 Поднявшийся народ должен добраться и до врагов общества.
 
Коммунистическая Партия Турции,
Центральный Комитет
(Перевод - Андрей Чабаненко)
Источник: сайт РКРП-КПСС

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Re: Турция
« Ответ #6 : 04/06/13 , 11:37:01 »
"Все планы в Турции сорваны"

Редакция сайта публикует эксклюзивное интервью лидера Компартии Турции.
 Просим извинить наших читателей за возможные неточности, связанные с трудностью перевода.

 
http://rkrp-rpk.ru/images/stories/tkp_kemal.jpg height=275

Главный редактор ежедневной газеты и член Центрального Комитета Коммунистической Партии Турции Kemal Okuyan ответил на вопросы, касающиеся борьбы, развернувшейся вокруг стамбульского парка Gezi, борьбы, в результате которой удалось многого добиться. Okuyan сформулировал ответы на такие актуальные вопросы, как «Куда движется Турция?», «Имеет ли место революционная ситуация?», «Можно ли назвать нынешние события «турецкой весной?»
 
Можно ли было ожидать социальное движение такого масштаба?

История показывает, что массовые социальные движения предвидеть, в общем, невозможно. В тех случаях, когда можно предсказать масштабы движения, то участники событий могут соответственным образом к нему подготовиться. Как при благоприятном, так и при негативном развитии событий, они пытаются воспользоваться результатами. В таком случае на движение падает тень подозрения в искусственности. Прогрессивные изменения, которые могли бы изменить текущее соотношение сил во власти, не происходят, и массовое социальное движение не возникает. Никто не был в состоянии дать оценку масштаба того, что происходит в настоящий момент. Ни правительство, ни официальная оппозиция, ни левые не смогли сделать этого. Были некоторые прогнозы, кто-то смог предсказать, что события достигнут критической точки, но никто не смог предвидеть того, что происходит сейчас. Это важно. Политический и идеологический климат в Турции сейчас отличается от того, что был 4-5 дней назад. Конечно, нельзя сказать, что он полностью изменился, однако эти изменения нельзя недооценивать.

Как объяснить распространение и мощь этого движения?

Совершенно очевидно, что это движение явилось кульминацией реакции общества, даже, можно сказать, ненависти общества к правительству, сформированному партией AKP, и, в особенности, к возглавляющему его премьер-министру Эрдогану. Для нас это не было чем-то новым, но было и то, что мы забыли принять во внимание: это усиление ненависти к премьеру, происходившее по мере усиления его самоуверенности и чувства собственной безнаказанности. С другой стороны, все считали ненависть к премьеру чем-то само самим разумеющимся, и развивать дальше эту тему считали ненужным. Но ненависть – это не такая эмоция, которую можно считать само собой разумеющейся. Если ненависть найдет способ – она выйдет наружу. Трудно себе представить человека, который бы гордился своими достижениями больше Тайипа Эрдогана. Ему удалось добиться такого внимания в мире, которого удавалось добиться не многим общественным деятелям.

Неужели все так просто, т.е. весь вопрос сводится к гневу в отношении Эрдогана?

Конечно, нет. Но нельзя и недооценивать важность этого фактора. Например, если бы мы имели дело не с такой доминирующей фигурой, как Эрдоган, а, например, с главой партии АКР Абдуллой Гюлем, то уровень реакции на действия правительства быстро вернулся бы к норме. Конечно, данное утверждение не означает, что здесь нет никакой идеологической составляющей. Конечно, Эрдоган является своего рода катализатором, в значительной мере усиливающим процессы, но цель движения – покончить с такими фундаментальными идеологическими принципами, нашедшими свое выражение в партии АКР, как классовое неравенство, реакционность и пособничество империализму, и в центре всего этого – фигура Эрдогана. Премьер-министр заявляет: «Это не о деревьях». У меня в голове не укладывается это его высказывание… После определенного момента это уже действительно не про деревья парка Gezi. Это было последней каплей. Он не представлял того гнева и ненависти, которое вызовут его действия…

Основная особенность партии АКР – это неолиберальная ориентация на рынок. Нет ли здесь связи?

Конечно, мы не можем отмахнуться от этого вопроса, просто заявив, что здесь мы имеем дело с реакцией среднего класса. Если реакция среднего класса в Турции достигла такого уровня, то нужно начать обдумывать и другие вопросы. Да, конечно это протест, прежде всего, среднего класса, однако, имеет место также серьезная мобилизация населения рабочих районов, в частности, в Стамбуле и Анкаре. Если мы забудем о том, что помнили всегда, и начнем выносить поверхностные суждения, то можно наделать ошибок. Во-первых, необходимо решить вопрос о том, какая идеология - социалистическая или буржуазная - является определяющей в движении, помогает ему преодолеть рамки протеста среднего класса. Необходимо серьезно отнестись к вопросу о том, кто является гегемоном движения. Размытость определений понятия «средний класс» приведет к большим ошибкам. Годами левые в Турции называли этот социальный слой «белыми турками». Конечно, в этом вопросе необходимо проявить четкую классовую позицию, равно как и классовое чутье. С другой стороны, необходимо избегать и упрощенных подходов. Во-вторых, нам необходимо помнить о структуре рабочего класса в Турции. Существующие возможности по организации рабочего класса по месту производства ограничены, так как вследствие существующей безработицы рабочие вынуждены часто менять работу. Настало время взглянуть на проблему подходов к рабочим с другой стороны. Мы потратили много времени, вовлекая рабочих в профсоюзы, но и они оказались недостаточно надежны, и теперь, когда поднялась вся страна, мы этих союзов не видим. Это не тот инструмент, который мобилизует рабочий класс и сделает его лидером, ведущей силой движения масс! Ранее такого удавалось добиться при помощи политических структур. Десятки тысяч людей, относимых к среднему классу, претендуют, по сути дела, на руководство антикапиталистическим движением. Причина заключается в том, что большинство этих людей принадлежат к эксплуатируемым слоям населения.

Является ли данное движение спонтанным, или мы имеем дело с более глубокими планами?

Некоторые из приближенных к властям СМИ заявляют, что силы зла были мобилизованы для организованного восстания. Если бы это было на самом деле так, то и результат был бы иным. Сторонники теории заговоров могут успокоиться: это просто взрыв народного гнева. Очевидно, что политические силы, разделяющие неприятие правящего режима, естественно присоединились к текущему народному возмущению и выступили совместно. Тем не менее, не следует преувеличивать значение этого фактора. Пусть сторонники теории заговоров ищут подтверждение своим теориям где-нибудь еще. Совершенно очевидно, что со стороны оппозиционных политических сил имеет место попытка скорректировать, изменить политику Эрдогана. С одной стороны, в этом заинтересованы США, с другой – секта Фетуллаха Гюлена. Обе этих силы стремятся вновь обрести контроль над политикой Эрдогана как во внешней, так и во внутренней политике. Эрдогану все дается непросто, не отличает его и последовательность. У него уже был взрыв в Рейханлы, но этого, по-видимому, оказалось недостаточно. В деле с протестами по поводу парка Gezi США и секта Ф. Гюлена, оставив Эрдогана без поддержки в опасной ситуации, продемонстрировали ему последствия инцидента в Рейханлы. Я не уверен, что до него дошло. Сюда же следует отнести и то, что на прошлой неделе в качестве кандидата на пост главы муниципалитета Стамбула постоянно упоминалось имя Sar?g?l (Sar?g?l – глава одного из районов Стамбула, он социал-демократ и имеет сильные связи с рядом представителей класса капиталистов). В СМИ также постоянно упоминается о новых контактах секты Гюлена с партией СНР (главная буржуазно-оппозиционная партия в Турции).

Подходит ли для нынешних событий определение «Турецкая весна»?

Употребляемое в СМИ империалистических стран название «Турецкая весна» - это послание Эрдогану. По сути дела они вполне довольны Эрдоганом и не планируют его замену, но одновременно, они указывают ему на его место. После последних событий политика Эрдогана в отношении Сирии и Ирака должна быть изменена. Я думаю, что его шансы в качестве будущего президента также исчерпаны. Существует возможность улучшения отношений между Эрдоганом и сектой Гюлена и выработки ими совместной идеологической и политической позиции, направленной против общественного протеста. Конечно, для этого потребуется определенное время. С другой стороны, гнев Эрдогана может заставить его предпринять ответные действия в отношении секты Гюлена, при этом возможны интересные результаты. Тем не менее, вряд ли стоит ожидать, что Эрдоган будет действовать, как разумный политик, а растерянный Эрдоган никому не будет нужен.

Именно в этом заключается историческое значение событий?

Совсем не в этом. Не нужно пытаться подстегивать это движение. Это народное выступление. Люди рассержены. Тем, кто недооценивал оппозицию Эрдогану и его партии АКР, стоит пересмотреть свои взгляды. То же самое следует сделать тем, кто считал, что при Эрдогане будет мир и демократизация. Все эти планы провалились. Не слушайте аналитиков. Это – социальное движение. Некоторые политические силы пытаются использовать движение не для борьбы за будущее, а для оказания давления на правительство. Но на этом дело не остановится. Последние события послужили делу организованного народного движения. Эрдоган был оставлен без поддержки потому, что в противном случае гнев был бы направлен на тех, кто его поддерживал. Они очень осторожны. Возможно, они прибегнут к разным уловкам. Например, будет использована необузданная жестокость полиции…

Как вы оцениваете готовность турецких левых?

Вопрос о том, кого в Турции считать левым, всегда вызывает много споров. Некоторые группы леваков не интересуются текущей политикой. Есть некоторые группы, которые не интересуются текущими выступлениями или относятся к ним отрицательно. Я не хочу подробно на них останавливаться. В то же время силы, серьезно вовлеченные в политику, оказались не готовы возглавить движение. Тем не менее, это движение для левых не чужое. Как я уже упоминал, во многих местах организованные левые повели за собой народ.
Некоторым не нравится вмешательство левых. Им мешает политическая идентификация, партийные флаги и транспаранты.
Это не случайно, если вы вспомните о спонтанности выступлений. С другой стороны, во многих местах люди требуют организации при помощи координирующего центра. Если принять во внимание масштаб выступлений, то прямой вклад левых организаций ограничен, но решимость людей зависит от левых сил. Есть также и интеллектуалы, которые испытывают аллергию к организованным левым и стремятся монополизировать движение. Мы не воспринимаем их всерьез. У нас есть честные интеллектуалы, которые оказывают сопротивление этому правительству. Левые должны поддерживать их, а не тех, кто занимает позицию, враждебную в отношении левых сил и в отношении любой политической организации в целом.

В этом движении есть два элемента: футбольные болельщики и алкоголь…

Участие футбольных болельщиков привнесло в движение энергию. Тем не менее, этот фактор необходимо проанализировать отдельно. Эта энергия вызвала также ряд проблем. В качестве примера приведу грубую ругань, ранее не характерную для политических демонстраций в Турции. Я это наблюдал сам. Некоторые из наших товарищей-женщин, которые раньше критиковали отдельные статьи в нашей газете за использование «мужских ругательств», сами ругались с использованием «сексистских» выражений. Конечно, это можно объяснить проявлением гнева, но движение социалистической направленности должно устанавливать свою собственную культуру. Тоже касается и алкоголя. Так как Эрдоган старается ввести в стране сухой закон, то его употребление стало символом свободы. Тем не менее, протест следует переводить в политические формы. Нельзя бороться с угнетением с пивной бутылкой в руке. Поэтому я полагаю, что решение Турецкой Коммунистической Партии о запрете употреблять спиртные напитки во время демонстраций стало очень важным.

Как мы можем определить эти события? Это революционный кризис?

Нет. Конечно, это выброс социальной энергии огромной силы, как по размаху, так и по последствиям. Тем не менее, в марксизме существует несколько критериев, чтобы охарактеризовать ситуацию как революционную. Мы еще не соответствуем, по крайней мере, в настоящее время…

Перевод - Андрей Чабаненко

 Источник: сайт РКРП-КПСС